Being a Judge in the Modern World by Hallett, Lady Justice





BEING A JUDGE IN THE MODERN 
WORLD 
 
Lady Justice Hallett 
 
21st Pilgrim Fathers’ Lecture 






It is a pleasure and an honour to have been invited to give this year’s Pilgrim Fathers’ 
lecture. I believe it is the 21st. Many congratulations on reaching this milestone. If you have 
spotted the body armour, I had a boating accident this summer. But, a broken back was not 
going to prevent my giving this lecture. It did however prevent my spending as much time 
coming up with fresh ideas as I should have wished. I spoke on a similar topic in Israel this 
week.  
 
The focus of this lecture looks at the role of judges today, on the changing judicial role. What 
do we expect our judges to be? What role or roles can and do judges actually play? Are 
modern judges more than judges, and if so in what way or ways?  
 
When I was called to the Bar in 1972 there was a perception, I emphasise perception, that 
the best way for a senior lawyer to improve his golf handicap was to go on the bench. If ever 
that was the case it most certainly is not the case now. Some parts of the media believe that 
we work only between 10.30 and 4.30 (at most) because that is when we are visible in court 
doing the job that judges have always done - dispute resolution. But, there are two things 
wrong with that assumption - first a judge does not go into a courtroom blind. Considerable 
preparation is required before and after a court day. Judgments and summings up do not 
write themselves and in our adversarial system we do not have the benefit of law clerks to 
assist us as many other jurisdictions do - a factor people forget when they publish stark 
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headlines about the cost of legal aid. Other jurisdictions may spend less on advocates but 
they spend far more on judicial support.  
 
Second, there is far more to judging these days than simply sitting in court directing the jury 
on what constitutes an offence or deciding which car ran into which. The law has become 
increasingly complex and the burdens far greater than ever before for the modern judge. 
This is not a cry for sympathy or attention – merely an attempt to explode myths.   
 
The issue is one the Judicial College (which is responsible for training approximately 36,000 
lay and professional judges in England Wales) set as its theme for its inaugural academic 
programme in 2013-2014. We asked a number of senior judges, a human rights campaigner 
and a legal correspondent to give their takes on the theme ‘Being a judge in the modern 
world’. As only a lawyer could, one of the judges first considered what ‘modern’ meant. For 
the avoidance of doubt I use the term modern to mean the judge of today 2014. As you 
might expect all the judges focussed in part at least on the constitutional role of the judiciary. 
I shall, therefore, begin there. 
 
Constitutional Role   
I start with a brief look at the contrasting views of the judicial role articulated by Sir Francis 
Bacon, Lord Chancellor, and his great rival and eventual prosecutor, Sir Edward Coke, Chief 
Justice.  
 
Bacon took what might be described as a minimalist view of the judicial role: judges were to 
decide cases and nothing more. He explained the position in his essay, Of Judicature, in this 
way, 
 Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret 
 law, and not to make law, or give law … Judges ought to be more learned than witty, 
 more reverend than plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things, 
 integrity is their portion and proper virtue.2 
 
There is, of course, a certain irony in the last sentence. Bacon was perhaps the last person 
to talk about judicial integrity given that he lost office as Lord Chancellor for taking bribes 
from litigants. But the advice to be more learned than witty was excellent advice and applies 
to the modern judge as much as it did to the 17th century judge. Attempts at humour account 
for a significant proportion of the misreporting and pillorying of judges in the popular press. 
For example, my friend and former colleague retired High Court judge Oliver Popplewell tried 
the claim by sprinter Linford Christie over doping allegations. For those who do not 
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remember the case and I shall put this delicately - there was a reference to Christie’s 
physique as revealed by tight lycra running shorts. Oliver will go down in history as the judge 
who asked: ‘What is Linford's lunchbox?’ He insists he knew exactly what was meant and his 
remark was intended as a joke. But it haunts him nevertheless.  
 
Back to Bacon - for him the judge’s role was straightforward. Judges were not legislators: 
they did not make or give law. They simply interpreted it, for the benefit of the jury. Taken 
literally this view would not sit entirely easily with the long-established principle that the 
British judiciary can develop the common law; in which sense they were and are legislators. 
But by law making I assume Bacon was referring to the enactment of policy by legislators as 
opposed to the development of the Common Law.  
 
Coke took a decidedly different approach to statutory interpretation and the relationship 
between the judiciary and the Crown. For Coke, the judiciary were not lions under the throne 
as Bacon described them but lions over the throne who through the application of the 
common law could set aside legislation. As he famously put it, in Dr Bonham’s Case 
 In many cases, the common law will control Acts of Parliament, and sometimes 
 adjudge them to be utterly void, for when an Act of Parliament is against common 
 right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will 
 control it, and adjudge such Act to be void.3 
 
Coke’s assertion has been criticised as invalid on numerous occasions. Whether or not he 
was correct in 1610 there are a number of good reasons why his view holds no water now. 
In Jackson and others v Attorney General a number of appellants with an interest in fox 
hunting sought to strike down the Hunting Act designed to abolish hunting of foxes with 
dogs. In rejecting the challenge the late, very much missed Lord Bingham observed ‘The 
bedrock of the British constitution is … the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament.’4  
 
It is this principle that judges may pray in aid in defending their application of the ECHR. 
Parliament chose to enshrine the convention into English law through the Human Rights Act 
and therefore in upholding the Convention, judges are not thwarting the will of Parliament. 
They are implementing it. If Parliament does not like the way the Law is developing, it can 
change the law. The UK courts cannot, in general, set aside legislation.  
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However there have been a number of developments that have led some to argue that our 
Supreme Court is evolving into a Constitutional Court which might one day be tempted, in 
effect, to declare an Act unconstitutional.   
 
We already have two situations in which the courts can engage in judicial review of 
legislation in the UK. The first arises under the European Communities Act 1972, the second 
under the Human Rights Act 1998. Under the former, the courts may review, and if 
necessary, strike down UK legislation that is contrary to European Union law. Under the 
latter, the courts may review legislation to ascertain whether it is consistent with rights 
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. It may not strike down primary 
legislation, but may declare it to be incompatible - thus leaving it to the government and 
Parliament to decide whether to rectify the declared defect, or not. In both cases the judiciary 
is not acting under a power granted by the Constitution. It is acting under a power provided 
by Parliament itself.  
 
There have been relatively few final declarations to date. The area which has caused 
considerable political controversy is the reliance on the HRA to overturn administrative 
decisions in applications for judicial review.  
 
The growth in administrative work has been one of the major changes in my time as a 
lawyer. When I studied law most judges would not see an application for Judicial Review 
from one end of their career to another. Today large numbers of tribunal judges and most if 
not all our QBD High Court judges have to sit on admin cases because of the flood of work. 
Some ministers (often at the sharp end of litigation) feel the pendulum has swung too far and 
many of the claims are totally unmeritorious. Others argue that proposed limitations on 
Judicial Review could lead to injustice and would be contrary to the Rule of Law.  
 
In my view one of the reasons the Human Rights Act has provoked such controversy is 
because it imports philosophical concepts into the Law with which the judges must grapple 
and about which there is ample scope for disagreement as in the right to a private and family 
life. One man’s claim to a family life is another man’s headline- ‘Catgate’. You may 
remember the row about whether a Bolivian National was allowed to stay in the UK because 
of his attachment to his pet cat. I don’t intend to explore the rights and wrongs of that 
particular decision but we are often faced with highly complex personal situations where 
legal training and precedent can take you only so far.  
 




How does a judge balance the interests of the public in deporting a dangerous criminal to his 
home country with the interests of the dangerous criminal who faces almost certain death if 
deported, in a way which will meet with universal approval?  
 
How well equipped is a court, even the most senior court in the land or in Europe,  
 to decide whether the right to life encompasses the right to choose death 
 to decide whether a pair of Siamese twins should be separated in an operation that 
would save the life of one but kill the other 
 or to decide who should have the care of a child born to a surrogate mother? These 
are the kind of decisions which as a result of the HRA and scientific developments 
increasingly come the way of the modern judge. 
 
I can however reveal that the court had little difficulty with the claim to a family life from a 
convicted drug dealer who fought deportation on the basis he had fathered 10 children by 
several different women in between his regular stays at HM pleasure. His family life 
consisted more of visiting time at Wormwood Scrubs. 
 
To read the press you might think the judges take a perverse delight in allowing dangerous 
men to walk the streets of England. We do not. We may not always get things right in 
balancing the interests of the individual with the interests of society as whole - as I say there 
is ample scope for disagreement - but we do our honest best to interpret what Parliament 
has laid down not strike it down.  
 
In October the House of Lords debated the report stage of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Bill which contains provisions to limit judicial review. In legal and political circles it is a hot 
topic and I do not intend to enter much further into the fray. 
 
I will say only this about the proposed limitations on Judicial Review - I hope that considered 
and constructive debate can produce a solution which meets the Government’s concerns 
(not all of which would be dismissed as groundless by a judge sitting in the administrative 
court) without significantly undermining the principle of Judicial Review. It is generally 
accepted that in any well-functioning democracy there must be an effective mechanism 
through which executive action can be subject to scrutiny.  
 
A novel form of Judicial Review has recently supplemented these forms of Judicial Review; 
novel at least in so far as the UK is concerned. Since the late 1990s the UK Parliament has 
devolved a number of powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Such devolution has 




provided legislative competence to the Scottish Parliament, Welsh and Northern Irish 
Assemblies.5 The devolution legislation provides the UK Supreme Court with a unique power 
to engage in ex ante legislative review. A Law Officer of the Crown, say the Attorney-
General of Northern Ireland, may refer a Bill from the Northern Irish Assembly, to the UKSC 
before it completes its legislative passage. The aim of the review is to ascertain whether the 
Bill is within the legislative competence of the devolved legislature. If the answer is yes, then 
there is nothing to stop the Bill completing its passage. If the answer is no, the Bill must be 
revised. The power has now been used a number of times.6  
 
Questions of policy remain solely within the realm of the executive and legislature, but all 
three branches must conclude that the technical, legal, power to enact the legislation exists. 
It will be interesting to see how this new jurisdiction develops. 
 
I turn to other developments in the court room. 
 
The Modern Judge as Case Manager 
The judicial role has in recent times undergone what could be described as an administrative 
turn. It is no longer confined, as it used to be in the common law world, with deciding cases 
based on the evidence and argument set before the court by litigants. The days of the judge 
as passive umpire are long gone.  
 
Since at least the 1990s in England and Wales, the power to control the pace and nature of 
the proceedings has been eroded and replaced by active case management by the courts. 
The case management powers granted to civil judges give courts the power to set the pace 
of litigation, through fixing procedural and trial timetables, limiting the amount of evidence 
that is subject to disclosure so that it is proportionate to the case, restricting expert evidence 
and encouraging mediation. It also now requires the court to act, as Sir Rupert Jackson put it 
in his Costs Review, as a project manager.  
 
As Sir Rupert put it, ‘All participants in a project must be aware of the budget for the project 
and aware of the budgetary consequences of what they do.’7 This is to be achieved by both 
parties submitting costs budgets to the court and as far as possible being required to stick to 
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them. It is hoped that costs will be managed prospectively, rather than assessed after the 
event. This role inevitably draws the judge into the litigation process far more.  
 
Andrew Mitchell MP who came into conflict with police officers at the gates of Downing 
Street in the row known as Plebgate and sued a newspaper about its reporting of the 
incident and aftermath discovered to his cost, or rather to his lawyers’ cost, that the courts 
will enforce deadlines. In a highly controversial decision the CA ruled that a very large sum 
of money which might have been recoverable by way of costs had deadlines been met were 
not recoverable because his lawyers failed to comply with the court’s directions.  
 
The judges are also being drawn far more into the trial process by the increase in numbers 
of Litigants in Person. Cutbacks in public funding have led to an explosion of LIPS in the 
courts. Again I do not wish to enter the political arena but this does cause problems for the 
judge. An adversarial system depends in general on the parties putting the case before the 
judge. However, even the most intelligent and educated Litigant In Person may fail to 
understand how to put their case effectively and may take far too long to do it. What is the 
judge to do? He or she does want to send away a LIP empty handed if they have a good 
case but the other side is entitled to fair treatment also. If the judge leans over backwards 
too far to help the LIP, the LIP’s opponent may have cause for complaint. Judging cases with 
LIPs involve a whole new set of skills which my predecessors would have required but 
rarely.  
 
Developments Outside the Courtroom -Leadership and Management  
Developments in the judcial role are not confined to the courts and court process. They have 
a purely administrative aspect. Historically, judges have always been involved in certain 
aspects of the administration of the justice system.  
 
However, this administrative role has expanded exponentially as a consequence of 2005’s 
Constitutional Reform Act (CRA). The CRA transferred a wide range of duties previously 
carried out by the Lord Chancellor to the Lord Chief Justice. The LCJ has been obliged to 
establish what could be called a judicial administration, or executive- known as the Judicial 
Office. There are officials reporting to the Lord Chief in human resources matters, 
appointments, budgeting, strategy and the like. Judges all around the country spend 
significant amounts of their time on every aspect of efficient judicial administration from 
judicial training, to human resources, to diversity, to the board of Her Majesty’s Courts and 
Tribunals Service. Recently the Master of the Rolls announced 30 to 40 per cent of his time 
is spent on administration. The LCJ and the Senior Presiding Judge sit hardly at all. The 




number of judges remains static and the court work has gone up not down - so that the 
same number of judges have to fulfil all these functions at the same time as maintaining the 
quality of service to the public.  
 
Modern Technology 
To some extent we are assisted in our court and out of court functions by the provision of IT. 
I would hate to destroy your picture of the crusty port soaked British judge sitting in his full 
bottomed wig and wielding his quill pen but many of us are relatively switched on when it 
comes to technology. Maybe not as switched on as the average 10 year told but perhaps as 
switched on as the average 50 year old.  
 
We beg for modern technology to improve our service to the public and to reduce costs. 
Many of us encourage the parties to send us documents in electronic form, use technology 
to present evidence and use video links where possible. In the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division, where I preside, we have been piloting paperless courts. However, I cannot say the 
technology we have been given, to date, is the most up to date - my son who is in the 
internet business saw the equipment provided for me and questioned if Noah had used it in 
the Ark. Harsh but I took his point. We have been promised better.  
 
Technology is also changing the nature of the cases in front of us particularly in crime and 
the investigation of crime. We face new criminal offences - such as online bullying, identity 
theft by hacking, jurors who research the cases they are trying on the internet and online 
conspiracies to abuse children. Developments in DNA testing have made a huge difference 
but so have the use of social media, the spread of Closed Circuit Television Cameras, and 
mobile telephones. In one case recently, a young woman thought she recognised her 
boyfriend’s attacker. In the ambulance on the way to hospital she went on to Facebook and 
by the time the police arrived she had a name and a face for them. Good for the 
investigation but a bit more difficult for judges used to carefully controlled ID procedures 
developed over decades.  
 
As for mobile telephone evidence and CCTV - hardly a criminal trial comes to court these 
days without one or both. I had an appeal in a murder trial where 5 men were convicted 
entirely on mobile phone evidence. Analysis of calls made, messages left and cell sites off 
which mobile phone signals bounced showed an unmistakeable pattern, as the mobile 
phone users plotted the crime, drove out of London to a small town in the country in three 
cars to commit the crime and drove away afterwards discussing what had happened on their 
way home.  





Communication and Relationship with the Public 
Advances in Technology have also changed our relationship with the public. We live in a 
world of instant communication and a demanding media - our link to the public. When 
preparing this lecture I asked a newly appointed friend what she felt was the most difficult 
thing about being a judge in the modern world. She felt that it was getting the balance right 
between being open and approachable to the court user, the press and the public and 
maintaining the appropriate level of judicial reserve. As she commented - I don’t expect the 
murderer I have just sentenced to 40 years to be my friend.  
 
There are still some journalists who mistake that reserve for being out of touch. In any event 
they prefer the stereotypical image of the crusty port soaked out of touch judge with his quill 
pen to which I referred earlier. It makes for a better story. Sadly reporting is not always 
constructive and sensible. At the slightest some journalists will leap on a decision of which 
they disapprove or an ill advised judicial comment (hence the earlier reference to heed 
Bacon’s advice about avoiding the temptation to be witty). Some descend to personal abuse. 
 
Couple that with the fact many stories are reported without facts being properly checked and 
the damage is done, as any victim of defamation can confirm. A judge’s reputation is sullied 
and there is another nail in the coffin of public confidence in the judiciary. I give one example 
- a judge gave the maximum sentence he could in accordance with the law - he was pilloried 
in the press and by politicians for being overly lenient. He and his family were door-stepped. 
His experience was not uncommon. That is increasingly the life of the modern judge.  
 
We try to head off this kind of attack by making our decisions and our reasoning as clear as 
possible. We allow tweeting in court, we issue summaries of the decision where appropriate 
and alert the Judicial Communications Office to high profile cases so they can offer the press 
assistance in understanding what has happened. We have allowed some broadcasting of 
appeals. But still the misreporting occurs. I do not suggest we are above criticism - far from 
it. It is the terms of the criticism to which I object and the failure to check facts. It is also the 
impact upon public confidence which concerns me.  
 
We have one of the best justice systems in the world - a system the government rightly 
intends to flaunt next year when we celebrate the 800th anniversary of the signing of the 
Magna Carta. It is a system worth billions to the UK economy. It is a precious thing to the 
UK’s citizens yet it does not seem to be a priority with many politicians of whatever political 
hue. The modern judge has a fight on his or her hands to ensure that standards do not drop.    





Extra curricular Judicial Comment 
Further, the modern judge has been known to use an opportunity such as giving a lecture of 
this kind to make that kind of point. This too is relatively new. Before the CRA 2005 it would 
have been the Lord Chancellor’s job to speak up for the judges. It would also have been his 
job (it has always been a he) to speak up for the judiciary generally. The Kilmuir Rules 
prevented judges speaking up for themselves. The Rules date back to 1955 when Lord 
Kilmuir then Lord Chancellor, declined a BBC request for judges to participate in a series of 
programmes, on the basis that…  
 the overriding consideration in the opinion of myself and of my colleagues is the 
 importance of keeping the Judiciary in this country insulated from the controversies of 
 the day. So long as a Judge keeps silent his reputation for wisdom and impartiality 
 remains unassailable: but every utterance which he makes in public, except in the 
 course of the actual performance of his judicial duties, must necessarily bring him 
 within the focus of criticism.  
 
Note the assertion that a judge will only keep his/her reputation for wisdom if they keep their 
mouths shut. There may be something in that. 
 
In 1987 Lord Chancellor Lord Mackay abolished the Kilmuir Rules. And with one bound they 
were free. There was such a flow of speeches and lectures from judges that Lord Neuberger 
then MR in 2012 cautioned about too many of them. ‘There are rather a lot of judicial 
speeches being made at the moment,’ he acknowledged. ‘I wonder whether we are not 
devaluing the coinage, or letting the judicial mask slip. In the light of the fact that I may be 
characterised as a serial offender, perhaps the less I say about that point, the better.’  
 
But, if the likes of Lord Neuberger and other serving judges do not speak out on important 
issues which impact upon the justice system, who will? There are a few retired judges and a 
few ennobled lawyers and concerned citizens who can and do use the House of Lords as a 
platform, but the serving judiciary, who encounter the problems day in and day out, have no 
obvious forum to air their views. The Lord Chancellor is no longer top judge and able to 
represent their views in Cabinet and serving judges may not speak in the House of Lords.  
 
The problem is that the vast majority of issues upon which the judges may wish to speak are 
likely to have a political dimension - I have touched on two this evening: legal aid cuts and 
the Human Rights Act. Judges have a truly and properly vested interest in both. But if they 
speak - do they risk entering the political arena and a collision course with politicians which 
could only end badly.   
 





Some might suggest that being a judge in the modern world today is no different from being 
a judge in the last century. The judiciary remains the third arm of the state ensuring that 
members of the Executive do not set themselves above the law, that the citizen can enforce 
his or her rights and that the criminal justice process operates fairly and effectively. Judges 
still on occasion stray from the courtroom and dispute resolution, as they always have done.  
 
But, the truth is expectations and roles have changed significantly; and those changes have 
not have been appreciated by all. The human rights campaigner Shami Chakrabati in her 
Judicial College lecture attributed this to what she called the constitutional illiteracy of many 
in politics and in the media. It is most unfortunate that not all those who have power and 
influence understand what is happening to our justice system. If no other argument holds 
sway, maybe they will listen to the economic one.  
 
When you hear a politician proudly celebrating the Magna Carta and the Rule of Law next 
year you may ask him or her ‘and what have you done to ensure the survival of a quality 
justice system?’. Maybe you could ask, as some of you will recall Tony Hancock asked: 
‘Magna Carta – did she die in vain?’  
 
Thank you 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
